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ABSTRACT This article examines the rising contention between a global foreign
policy promoting liberal democracy in the Middle East and Islamist rejectionism.
It provides a sociopolitical analysis of the phenomena of radical Islamist politics
while focusing on the experience of Hezbollah in Lebanon. It associates the
growth of Hezbollah, a political movement seen in various forms in several
countries, with social class dynamics that have been antagonised by social
inequality, opportunistic leadership, the importation of Western-ordered
democracy and by perceived foreign intervention. By examining the root dynamic
of Hezbollah in Lebanon, this article argues that poverty has provided the fertile
ground for the growth of Islamic populism as a revolutionary movement and has
represented a major reason for the rejection of democratisation and political
reform. A global foreign policy that seeks to uproot extremism in favour of state-
building and the advancement of democracy in the Middle East needs to be
reoriented so as to help undermine class inequality and to strengthen government-
sponsored public services programmes for the underclass.
Framing Foreign Policy Response to Islamist Movements in the Middle
East
Who would have thought that religion, once termed by Karl Marx the
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class-based ‘anti-capitalist’ political movements? Indeed, Islamists have
succeeded where most Marxists and secular reformers have failed in the
Middle East. Religious demagogues, charged with resentment toward
the national bourgeoisie and Western-imposed lifestyles, have prompted
the most appealing, mobilising and radicalising movement among the
broad masses of the poor. By forcefully and effectively confronting
enemies such as Israel and neocolonialism they also have addressed the
chronic historical sense of humiliation facing Arab societies.
While it has been proceeding in various forms for more than two
decades, many scholars have been intrigued by the phenomenal rise of
Islamist movements and have offered a range of explanations for this
upsurge. According to Masoud Kazemzadeh, three principal competing
traditions provide theoretical interpretations: Islamic exceptionalism
(cultural relativists, neo-Cold War warriors and Islamic ‘Fundamental-
ists’); comparative fundamentalisms; and class analysis.1 The first asserts,
in different perceptual outlooks, that Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ must be
examined as a phenomenon on its own.2 Alternatively, comparativists
argue that it is part of wider global development inspired by the rise of
religious movements.3 In contrast, class analysis uses social scientific
concepts to explain Islamic resurgence as a political movement that aims
to achieve class interest of a particular social group. Adherents of the
third paradigm include Farhad Kazemi (1980), Sami Zubaida (1993),
Ervand Abrahamian (1993), Misav Parsa (1989), Fred Halliday (1996)
and Adam Webb (2006) among others.4
Each one of the different traditions has implicated a distinct foreign
policy outlook. For instance, adopting an Islamic exceptionalism
paradigm necessitates examining the peculiarity of the phenomena at
hand, so as to assess the degree to which US or Western foreign policy in
the Middle East can be reformulated so as to defeat, accommodate or
‘contain’ Islamic radicalism. Eric Watkins, for example, attributes the
growth of Islamic fundamentalism to the bi-standards of US foreign
policy, seeking positive Arab relations while providing near total support
of Israel.5 From this perspective, undermining Islamic extremism
necessitates appropriate rebalancing of the US foreign policy. Abdesalam
M. Maghraoui recommends that such a containment strategy can be
further achieved through an ‘Islamic Renewal’ where support is
relocated to moderate-reform-minded Islamic groups.6 Of course, from
the opposite side of the spectrum is the security anti-terrorism
perception, where the war on terror, in addition to other remedies, is
considered the primary means of defending democracy and the ‘Western
way of life’ and defeating Islamic extremism.7
The comparative perspective, on the other hand, draws from
historical experiences and responses that have succeeded in undermining
similar trends. S.V.R. Nasr, for example, concludes that a foreign policy
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strategy of support for increased democratisation would guarantee the
inclusion of dissenters and extremists in the political process, and thus
moderate their radical appeal.8 In the comparative perspective, of
course, one notes that various strands of extreme Islamic movements
exist, contrasting for example ‘millennial’ movements for broad
regional or global goals with more localised and reactive movements
such as those among rival clans in failed or feeble states such as Somalia
or among newly emergent ‘Islamic’ political parties, Sunni and Shi’a, in
post-Saddam Iraq. Foreign policy is complicated in that such groups
might not agree among themselves and in that millennial movements
might try and manipulate such local groups to their advantage.9
Compared to both Islamic exceptionalism and comparativist views, the
socio-economic analysis of Islamist resurgence highlights a further
dilemma in foreign policy formation. Class analysis, particularly in
explaining the socio-economic dynamic of Islamic fundamentalism,
implies economic reform measures that undermine foreign policy
doctrines and global economic outlooks, as, for example, in the ‘free
market’ approaches of Western powers and international financial
organisations.While suchself-interested reformeffortsarenot impossible,
they may be unlikely, given doctrinaire approaches to capitalism and
limited government. In addition contemporary globalist policy, including
elements of both nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century
conservatism as seen in the US, emphasises, in addition to fostering buying
poweramongpotentialmarkets across theworld, removing tradebarriers,
privatising the public sector, pushing for the free flow of capital and
investment, reducing bureaucracy and regulations and abandoning
command-based economy.10 While references are made to reducing
poverty and corruption, notes that would agree with some Islamist
precepts, support is wanting for major shifts of wealth from advantaged to
disadvantagedclasses, as seen in the reaction toassertive ‘populists’suchas
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Though decidedly secular in orientation,
the latter has even discussed common resistance to global economic
hegemonism with Islamists in Iran.
Islamists themselves do not reject all forms of capitalism as long as
Islamic legal traditions and applications are maintained and as long as
their autonomous power is promoted. Those who would undercut Islam’s
class appeal range from reform advocates who desire to ‘put a human face
on capitalism and globalisation’ to those proposing the eradication of
global capitalism as a mean to win the struggle against regressive religious
movements. As Lal Khan put it, what is needed is ‘a political programme
– attacking imperialist exploitation – and the drudgery of landlordism
and capitalism, as necessary to seriously combat fundamentalism’.11
Socio-economic perspectives on foreign policy remain the least studied
in terms of Islamic appeal and the most difficult to apply in policy terms,
418 Imad Salamey & Frederic Pearson
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particularly when they contradict the prevailing global socio-economic
agenda. Thus framing a responsive foreign policy position to ‘contain’
Islamic extremism raises crucial questions: to what extent, if any, has
the radical Islamic movement emerged as a direct consequence of
deteriorating class conditions in regions such as the MiddleEast; whyhave
global and bilateral policies failed to be constructive and responsive in
engaging or coopting such radical reactions; and, finally, if marked socio-
economic improvement is realised in Islamic regions, will that obviate or
elevate the level of revolutionary fervour?
Establishing the Class Link
Increasingly studies have focused on the link between terrorism, political
extremism and economic conditions. While notable terrorists such as
Osama Bin Laden and associates have been anything but poverty-
stricken, considerable evidence points to the role of economic
deprivation as an underpinning for effective mobilisation, recruitment
and dedication to extremist causes.12 Based on such perceptions,
promoting economic justice and reducing inequality have become the
basis of increased advocacy in counter-terror policy.13 Significant to these
studies is the contribution of Brian Burgoon, who supports the notion
that effective social welfare policies undermine terrorism. He has
demonstrated that:
social welfare policies – including social security, unemployment, and health and
education spending – affect preferences and capacities of social actors in ways that,
onbalance,discourage terrorism:byreducingpoverty, inequality, andsocioeconomic
insecurity, thereby diminishing incentives to commit or tolerate terrorism, and by
weakening extremist political and religious organizations and practice that provide
economic and cognitive security where public safety nets are lacking.14
Analysts of popular rebellion such as Ted R. Gurr, however, have also
noted that the most destitute seldom join insurgencies. It is the
transitional communities, those who have risen above abject poverty but
have not yet reached a level of welfare commensurate with that of
others, that take to arms and employ violence to rectify their
comparative disadvantages and frustrations, especially if they also
experience ethnic discriminal.15
Promoting social welfare in the Middle East has been sometimes
overshadowed and other times associated in recent years with calls for
democracy and political reform, seemingly premised on the social science
claim that a peace exists among democratic states.16 One form of such
strategic thought came to be known as ‘The New Greater Middle East’
initiative, a US foreign policy vision, associated with the war in Iraq, that
prioritised political participation, institutional reform, gender equality,
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minority and ethnic rights, rule of law, privatisation and modernisation
as keys for the ultimate realisation of a stable, prosperous and peaceful
Middle East.17 The G8 Summit at Sea Island in 2004 adopted the ‘Greater
Middle East’ doctrine wherein priority in the ‘Broader Middle East and
North Africa’ was given to political, social, cultural and economic
spheres. In regard to the latter, which was the last stated priority, the G8
established supporting entrepreneurship as key to economic reform.
11.3 In the economic sphere, creating jobs is the number one priority of many
countries in the region. To expand opportunity, and promote conditions in which
the private sector can create jobs, we will work with governments and business
leaders to promote entrepreneurship, expand trade and investment, increase access
to capital, support financial reforms, secure property rights, promote transparency
and fight corruption. Promotion of intra-regional trade will be a priority for
economic development of the Broader Middle East and North Africa.18
The G8, however, has been confronted by the reality of war-borne
dislocation, failing entrepreneurship and emerging radical Islam
throughout the region.19 In 1997 the US National Intelligence Council
anticipated that ‘the increasing number of young unemployed men will
exacerbate social and political tensions throughout the region’.20
Evidently the G8 and US policy-makers have failed to offer this expanding
mass of unemployed population any substantial hope or economic
intervention beyond prescriptions for failing national entrepreneurship,
standing to lose ina highly competitive global market dominated bymajor
powers and developing states which have promoted mass-based technical
education and high levels of foreign investment (such as India).
Alternatively, and with extensive success, radical Islamists have
provided networks of social services and welfare-based sub-economies
for the poor and the unemployed. Building upon and perhaps exceeding
prior efforts by the PLO in the Palestinian territories, Hamas’s economic
public welfare network, along with its perceived anti-corruption and
hard-line policy on Israel, not only guaranteed itself wide public
support, but also helped the movement grasp electoral victory and
political power. Similar ‘democratic’ political success stories can be
found among Islamist organisations in Iraq (Jaysh Al-Mahdi), in Jordan
and Egypt (Islamic Brotherhood), in Lebanon (Hezbollah) and other
countries such as Yemen, Morocco, Algeria and Sudan. Nikki Keddie’s
analysis of Islamist groups in the Middle East concludes that:
[t]he considerable post-colonial failure of governmental solutions to
socioeconomic and cultural problems has brought a growing alienation between
people and their governments. In the Muslim world, governments have often
found it difficult to suppress Islamist movements because of their decentralized
organisation, use of mosques and religious networks and their increasing
popularity resulting from their provision of social services, especially to the poor.21
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It is particularly these social services that have provided Islamists with
wide public support while, despite the appeal of the global economy, the
USA’s ‘Greater Middle East’, suspected as a neocolonial control
mechanism, received condemnation on the ‘streets’. Similar to Keddie’s
views on identifying the causes behind radical mobilisation, scholars
have noted the rapid global change that is leaving behind masses of the
economically disadvantaged who, in turn, become subject to radical
‘social mobilisation’ that outruns ‘institutionalisation’ and, ultimately,
induces a revolutionary volatility.22 Ironically some trends along these
lines exist in America’s own inner-cities as well, though with generally
lower levels of political mobilisation.
In this article we take a closer look at Hezbollah in Lebanon, one
seemingly successful manifestation of Islamist political organisation that
has taken an active role in Lebanese and cross-border politics; we
examine the nature of the party’s: socio-economic roots, propaganda,
political tactics, mobilisation, alliance-making and alternative revolu-
tionary agenda. The intention is to reveal the extent to which Hezbollah
has grown on the backlash of local and global policies that hardly
address the immediate socio-economic conditions of the poor. It shows
how such conditions have instigated a revolutionary party dynamic with
class-based public support and regional backing that extend beyond
strict religious adherence.23 The revolutionary development of
Hezbollah in Lebanon indicates a growing wedge between the social
classes and increasing polarisation in global visions.
Conceivably the appeal of radical Islam cannot be offset without
solutions to major political conflicts such as those involving Israel and
the reduction of Western presence in the region. However, if the socio-
economic characterisation of Islam’s class based appeal is accurate, it
would appear that radical Islamic appeal cannot be effectively reduced
without global, regional, and national socio-economic initiatives
prioritising the reduction of inequality and providing the ‘underclass’
with institutionally sponsored social service networks, housing,
educational and employment opportunities.
An Anti-Bourgeois Vanguard Party
While general sympathies have been growing across many sectors of
Middle Eastern society, hardcore support for Islamist parties tends to
come from within the poorest urban slums, from workers in factories
and from the rural villages where support for Islamist groups such as
Hezbollah is nurtured and cultivated as a counterweight to what is seen
as class-based exploitation. According to a nationwide public opinion
poll conducted by Statistics Lebanon with 400 participants in June
2006, Hezbollah drew most of its support from lower socio-economic
Hezbollah: A Proletarian Party 421
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groups; 81 per cent of those expressing support for Hezbollah were of
lower socio-economic strata with monthly income below US$1,000;
38.6 per cent had below middle school education, 45.6 per cent received
secondary education, and only 15.8 per cent had college education.24
Having been left out of the processes of globalisation, democratisation,
modernisation and state building; with hardly enough to eat or a place
to sleep, the poorest classes in Lebanon have created their own political
allegiances. For those who have nothing to lose, Hezbollah has shown
the way: there are a whole world and a heaven to conquer.
A revolutionary styled vanguard party, Hezbollah has offered a
permanent class struggle with godly support that links national liberation
with cultural cleansing and class emancipation. While indigenously
Lebanese, centred in the Shi’a communities, Hezbollah’s revolution has
been Trotskyite in its international appeal, for no national borders,
doctrinal differences or democratic stages precondition its revolutionary
appeal.25 The party is internationalist in its dynamics and has succeeded
in linking the poorest Lebanese Shi’ites with Sunnis in Gaza, Palestinian
refugees across the region, ‘anti-imperialists’ in Iraq and Syria,
revolutionaries in Iran and anti-American/Western movements through-
out the Middle East.26 Middle Eastern Islamists such as Hezbollah, along
with their Iranian and Arab allies, have proved to be unwavering
obstacles against a US-sponsored ‘Greater Middle East’ initiative
involving the attempted installation of pro-Western ‘democracies’ even
as the Islamists themselves take part in democratic processes and
parliaments.
Despite its highly attractive appeal for a wide sector of middle-class
groups, professionals and entrepreneurs, who have long awaited the
prospect of democratisation and global integration in the region,
American-sponsored democratisation has hardly won the ‘hearts or
minds’ of the modern classes in most states, let alone the poor.27 While
prosperity was initially promised in the ‘liberation’ of Iraq, for the
economically dispossessed, estranged democratisation provided no
direct answer to hardship, violence and widespread unemployment.28
Women’s equality, human rights, electoral participation, minority
rights, rule of law, environmental protection, political reform, while
compelling aspirations, have remained cliche´s to the vast majority of the
masses struggling against a persistent sense of cultural humiliation and
for daily water, bread and butter.29 Worse, democratisation, as such, has
increasingly appeared as a hostile movement whose end result is
strengthening corrupt elements of government, alienating ethnic and
sectarian communities, barring disfavoured (usually Islamist) parties
from taking office, facilitating foreign intervention and investment,
failing to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and undermining the
underclass.
422 Imad Salamey & Frederic Pearson
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For such reasons, as well as their well-developed social welfare service
functions modelled on Iranian experience, Hezbollah and other
authoritarian styled Islamist groups have gained greater appeal among
the Lebanese poor than any democratic movement. As a consequence,
certain modernist leftist groups that have championed democracy
and/or social justice, despite their opposition to globalisation excesses,
began to emerge at odds with the largely poor masses. For reasons of
secular reform and anti-Syrian nationalism after 2005, the Lebanese
Democratic Left, a group of ex-Communists and socialists, found their
secular programme for democratic government in general harmony with
the right-wing Hariri-led Future Movement and at odds with Hezbollah
and its supporters.30 Hezbollah’s agitation campaign among the poor
and the opportunity afforded by Israel’s bombardment and invasion in
July–August 2006 further elevated the party as both a proletarian
vanguard and nationalist standard-bearer leading the struggle against a
‘Western imposed imperialist democracy’ in the Middle East.31
These developments have spotlighted various forms of perceived
hypocrisy in US policy. While praising and backing Lebanon’s new
government and the democratic resistance to previous Syrian domina-
tion, US policy, alongside Israel’s ill-fated and destructive anti-
Hezbollah campaign of 2006, has undermined and discredited those
very elements of Lebanese reform. While speaking for democracy,
Washington clearly draws the line against devolution of power to duly
elected Islamist and extremist organisations. While prioritising counter-
terror, US military equipment has been used to inflict destruction if not
terror on civilian populations. While speaking of the virtues of private
enterprise, American lawmakers fail to give preferences to imports or
the indigenous industries of stricken developing states.32
For the vast majority of poor, democratisation and globalisation have
been associated with an ever-increasing social inequality, with affluence
concentrated in metropolitan areas and among the educated, leaving
rural areas and urban suburbs to poverty.33 Democracy has emerged, if
anything, in direct antagonism with the sociopolitical conditions of the
underprivileged. In most cases, it ensures the rule of law and strengthens
government control, with implications of removing illegal housing,
controlling illegal labour, imposing taxes, enforcing city zoning codes
and expanding governmental authority, implying greater dispossession
and less security for the poor. While job opportunities have filtered
down for some, the general gaps in education and opportunity as well as
low wage scales have limited democracy’s and globalisation’s promise of
prosperity. It was relatively easy for the Hezbollah leadership to capture
the imagination and sympathy of poverty-stricken peoples and
those fearing the domination of alien social groups, secular and
religious powers. Indeed, traditional advocates of the mass Shi’a
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populations in southern Lebanon, such as the Amal movement, have
had to give way and join with the more dynamic Hezbollah leadership
(see Figure 1).
Capturing these sentiments, Hezbollah, as other Islamists, have
incorporated alternative campaigns to empower the poor and weaken
the ‘establishment’. Hezbollah-controlled urban slums and rural areas
have emerged as closed pockets, operating as states within the state and
beyond the reach of the central authority. Following a pattern set during
the Iranian revolution, the party uses mosques and religious centres
as civil courts and establishes religious school networks, hospitals,
Figure 1. Distribution of religious groups in Lebanon. Source: C1A, 1983.
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orphanages, social service centres, media outlets, boy scouts, civil
defence and mujahedeen fighters all organised independently from
central state power.34 These form in distinction from ‘civil society’
organisations which the West tends to see as the building-blocks of
democracy – professional and voluntary social service organisations
and ‘non-profits’ which bind people together across cultural lines, a
civic model that has some manifestations (e.g. Rotary clubs and
professional organisations) but has hardly succeeded broadly in the
Middle East.35
ThusHezbollah-controlled territoriesbegan toemergeasabaseofpride
for the poor, while instigating greater fears and concerns for the wealthy
and middle classes, as well as for non-Shi’a and non-Muslim sectors of the
society. These territories have become refuges for low-paid labourers, the
unemployed and outlawed renegades, providing a safe haven for those
who have not been able to afford high-rental housing, state taxes and the
comparative luxury of Westernised cities. While daily routines and family
responsibilities dominate the lives of most poor people, their mass
concentration can appear to be a revolutionary reservoir ready to explode
at any moment against the sociopolitical status quo.
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, once served by secular PLO social-
service organs, have emerged as natural allies to Hezbollah and
associated Islamist movements since they too have been left out of the
growing economic prosperity. For them, the creation of a strong
Lebanese government could be, arguably, the worst scenario, and they
have fiercely battled the emergence of strong Lebanese authority since
the late 60s.36 Their experiences with strong Arab governments stood
witness to massacres and suppressions as experienced in Jordan, Syria,
Iraq and Kuwait. Devastating socio-economic conditions inside and
outside refugee camps remained the major reason for their sympathy
and support for Hezbollah, though a rift may have occurred with the
ultra-radical Sunni based Palestinian–Lebanese fighting of 2007.37
Thus an important reason for Hezbollah’s rise to power in Lebanon as
well as that of Islamists elsewhere has been its ability to transform
masses of adherents into a coherent movement against the social
‘stability’ of the country. The party was quick to mobilise its supporters
behind economic demands, often in public demonstrations against
government policies and regulations, frequently threatening govern-
mental collapse. Hezbollah continued to dampen entrepreneurial
interests by its ability to spread mob actions throughout
commercial districts and to obstruct economic and political life at
will.38 The disaffected rallied behind the party with enthusiasm,
having grown frustrated with economic growth that targeted sectors
such as tourism while urban areas were invaded by ‘alien’ Western
lifestyles.39
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Diffusing Bourgeois Opposition
Opposition to the party from within its own sectarian ranks has been
muted for important reasons. First, the party was able to threaten
dissidents and renegades. Opposition risked community isolation and
accusation of treason and infidelity. Additionally, the party represented
an important political outlet by preserving power and access for elite
Shi’ites within the Lebanese confessional structure. By its sectarian
mobilising power, its participation in government and through its
respective sectarian elites, Hezbollah has made political gains that
retained important public offices to the advantage of the Lebanese Shi’ite
community. This wasmanifest in the party’s alliance with its own national
sectarian bourgeoisie, such as the Amal Movement, with the latter kept in
close sectarian rank. After all, the Shi’ite national bourgeoisie recognised
thatHezbollah,with its growingconstituency,wasa crucial force for their
own political survival amid the country’s sectarian power struggles.
Internal sectarian unity further helped the party to outmanoeuvre its
political opponents by gaining legitimacy through the ballot box and by
joining official governmental ranks. This allowed Hezbollah to utilise
public forums for its own purposes, often by using governmental
institutions and the press against the government itself. Party candidates
headed electoral lists, established electoral alliances and coordinated
effective election campaigns to win parliamentary seats and municipal
offices. After electoral sweeps in their districts, Hezbollah MPs not only
entered municipalities, parliament and the cabinet for the purpose
of accessing public services and resources for their constituencies, but
also used these official offices as public forums to expose governmental
corruption, criticise policies and obstruct strong central authority.40
Thus, in a bold duality which other parties were ineffective in resisting,
the revolutionary character of the party was preserved while
government institutions were subjugated to the party’s own ends.
Fearing a solid opposition being crystallised against its programme by
government middle- to upper-class based bourgeois parties (known as
the March 14th Alliance – see Table 1), Hezbollah aimed to break the
ranks of its political foes. It sought a coalition with a wide national
network of politically marginalised individuals and opposition groups
(known as the March 8th Alliance – see Table 1), pitting them against
government parties while providing them with the necessary financial
and political support.41 Its coalition-building opportunism and success
against government parties was best seen when the party struck an
alliance with the Maronite Christian-based Free Patriotic Movement of
General Michel Aoun (see ‘Aoun-led Alliance’ in Table 1), a deal that
guaranteed the party’s support across sectarian lines and denied the
government parties’ claims of an absolute national majority. These
426 Imad Salamey & Frederic Pearson
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Table 1. Distribution of political alliances, 2005 Lebanese Parliament
Alliance Main bloc/leader Leading party/affiliation Main/leading confession Parliamentary size %
March 14th Alliance 71 55.47
Hariri Future Movement Sunni 39 30.47
Jumblat Progressive Socialist Party Druze 16 12.50
Ja’Ja Lebanese Forces Maronite 4 3.13
Atallah The Democratic Left None/secular 1 0.78
Ahdab Renewal Democratic Movement Sunni 1 0.78
Qornet Shehwane Independent Maronite 7 5.47
Tripoli Coalition Independent Sunni 3 2.34
March 8th Alliance 35 27.34
Berri Amal Movement Shi’ite 16 12.50
Nasrallah Hezbollah Shi’ite 15 11.72
Baath Party Baath Party None/Secular 1 0.78
Syrian Nationalist Party Syrian Social Nationalist Party None/Secular 1 0.78
Kataab (pro-Syrian) Kataab (pro-Syrian) Maronite 1 0.78
Saad Nasserites Sunni 1 0.78
Aoun-led Alliance 21 16.41
Aoun Free Patriotic Movement Maronite 14 10.94
Skaff Many Maronite 5 3.91
Murr Many Orthodox 2 1.56
Independent Dakash Independent 1 0.78
Total 128 100.00
Source: EU Election Mission to Lebanon 2005, Final Report on the Parliamentary Election
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alliances and political tactics provided Hezbollah with the ability to
operate from within the government to disrupt the formation of
coherent pro-government policies; at the same time it allowed the party
to orchestrate opposition from the outside as well.
Working within a complex Lebanese socio-sectarian-regional
environment (see Figure 1), the party succeeded in nationalising support
for its agenda well before the events of summer 2006. Despite its radical
Islamic appeal, Hezbollah had popularised itself as a voice for other
deprived socio-sectarian groups, including certain Lebanese Christians,
a remarkable achievement by any measure. It emerged as the party of the
oppressed, opposing government policies and privatisation efforts that
targeted public programmes and the safety nets of the lower classes.
The party’s anti-Western, anti-Israeli cultural rhetoric further mobilised
traditional and conservative elements across the religious divide. For
these reasons, anti-Hezbollah groups, particularly the March 14th
Alliance, failed to isolate the party or undermine its popularity. On the
contrary, the party appeared to draw support from larger cross-sectional
groups throughout the county in support of its political programme.42
This momentum finally allowed Hezbollah to wage an unprecedented
anti-government campaign that culminated in November 2006 with the
resignation of the opposition ministers from the cabinet, pushing to the
street massive anti-government demonstrations that literally mobilised
half the country’s population, organising an open sit-in in downtown
Beirut that brought Lebanon to a standstill, imposing a one-day general
strike that shutdownallpublicandprivate sectors,andbringingthecounty
to the edge of an open conflict and civil war.
Perhaps among the most strategically significant characteristics of
Hezbollah has been its accumulation of weapons and its well-trained and
disciplined internal security apparatus that has remained beyond the
government’s control. These capabilities were impressively displayed
during Israel’s invasion following the killing and capture of Israeli soldiers
in the Lebanese-Israeli border area. The party’s historical reputation as
being the sole force against Israeli occupation in the south, and as a
resistance movement opposed to national security infringements, stripped
the Lebanese government of the ability to disarm it or to decrease its
militarypresence inanestimatedquarterofLebanese territories.Theparty
defended its acquisition of weapons through the pretext of continuous
Israeli threats and rejected efforts aimed at restricting its resistance
forces.43 Thus the party has accumulated all crucial political and military
foundations to establish a quasi-state operating within the state.
In sum, Hezbollah ensured itself a solid backing from a large lower
socio-economic section of the population whose interests seem to run in
contradiction with the promises of democratisation, modernisation and
state-building. The party’s political advantages were elevated by
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outmanoeuvring opponents, establishing a wide national anti-govern-
ment coalition, using public institutions for the government’s own demise
and effectively confronting Israel, both during the Israeli occupation of
the predominantly Shi’a Southern region before the year 2000 and later
during the Israeli military campaigns of 2006. Significant to the party’s
power was its ability to immanently move massive anti-government
demonstrations as well as its ability to spur its supporters to mob uprising
in commercial centres across the country, thus sabotaging civil peace.44
Joining an Anti-Imperialist International Alliance
Hezbollah’s strength was not drawn from national class-based support
and a revolutionary programme alone. Rather, it was manifest in the
party’s successfully linking its struggle to topple democratisation,
modernisation and stronger government with that of a wider regional
network of states and groups standing to lose power with the
implementation of the American-sponsored ‘Greater Middle East’
paradigm. Nation states such as Iran and Syria, along with such groups
as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian and Iraqi insurgent militia joined the
core of this regional revolutionary alliance.45 In turn, Hezbollah has
become the leader in the struggle against the new political order by
opening the battleground against Israel in a bid to support Hamas and
mobilise the Arab street against the US-Israeli camp, thereby sparking the
largest anti-American grass-roots protest movement in the Middle East.
After all, it is the confrontation with Israel and Hezbollah’s remarkable,
though still limited, tactical successes that have given the party its widest
regional appeal to call for an open battle on behalf of the ummah, which
was reduced in actuality to an appeal for cross-regional class solidarity
against the invasion of perceived democratic imperialism.46
For this reason, many conservative, monarchical, wealthy and Sunni-
or Christian-based factions and Arab governments across the region also
grew to fear and sporadically criticise the movement. Sunni regional
initiatives involving states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in
consultation with Western powers, to contain the expansion of Shi’a
power as seen in Iraq and Lebanon have been evident since 2006. Yet the
more Hezbollah appeared to succeed where other Arab nationalists and
leaders had failed, especially militarily, the more difficult and
embarrassing it became for critics to remain vocal.47
Hezbollah’s strategic regional importance became evident when it was
able to fill the power gap left by the Syrian pullout from Lebanon in May
2005. It was Hezbollah’s struggle against anti-Syrian Lebanese domestic
groups that gained the party crucial backing from the Syrian-Iranian
regimes and further strengthened the Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah-Hammas
front. Its consistent struggle against the predominantly anti-Syrian
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Lebanese cabinet and parliament helped shield the Syrian regime from
an all-out international condemnation over a widely believed Syrian-
sponsored assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minster Rafik
Hariri.48 In fact, and after two years of consistent opposition, Hezbollah
was able to delay and undermine an all-out international tribunal against
an alleged Syrian link with the Hariri assassination.
Hence, despite the party’s small size, its dependence for armament and
financing on regional powers such as Syria and Iran and its place within a
sectarian political system in a very small nation, Hezbollah’s significance
and influence have been demonstrated in its ability to instigate tactical
battleswhile mobilising the support andaspirationsof large economically
deprived and frustrated social groups across Lebanon, the Middle East
and Muslim states. Hezbollah gained the political initiative in both
domestic struggle for economic justice as well as in the international
struggle against Israel and the US, preventing regional governments and
political opponents from presenting any serious challenge.49
Seen in this light, Hezbollah has emerged as a revolutionary
proletarian party with an Islamic manifesto par excellence. Its model
has inspired greater militancy in groups in the region, who have found
among the dispossessed and disillusioned a fertile ground for a mass
opposition against outside and non-Muslim regional domination,
groups including Hamas and Islamic Jihad among Palestinians, as well
as Jaysh Al-Mahdi in Iraq. Ironically, the greater Hezbollah’s success in
resisting Israel through guerrilla and armed tactics, the less the apparent
need for more primitive forms of terrorism and resistance, such as
suicide bombing missions.
A key strategy in this new wave of resistance by entities such as
Hezbollah and Syria, a state that seeks to maintain both access to the
West and resistance to Western domination, is the manipulation of social
and regional stability to achieve political demands. Sometimes this
can happen in literal abductions such as the capture of Israeli military
personnel, useful both as a trigger for Israeli responses and for
subsequent prisoner exchanges or ‘liberations’ – though Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s general secretary, maintained that the destructive
consequences of the summer 2006 confrontation went well beyond what
he had anticipated. Sometimes the strategy entails undermining the
parties and forces of traditional Arab ruling elites. In Lebanon, this
strategy has jeopardised the ability of the national bourgeoisie to sustain
and fulfil its goals in attracting foreign investment, stabilising the
economy, strengthening governmental authority, resisting outside
intervention and advancing political reform and democracy. This further
demonstrates that the party has acted as an anti-globalist force using
Islamic slogans, even as it might pragmatically cooperate with merchant
and middle-class economic interests, as the Iranian leadership did earlier.
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Anti-Democratic Thesis: A Non-Government Party-Commanded
Welfare Economy
Democratisation in Lebanon, indeed in the region as a whole, has been
sabotaged by instability and economic conditions that rendered political
and institutional reform irrelevant, if not contradictory to the aspirations
of the lower social classes. In fact, Hezbollah’s armed struggle against
Israel, with the active support of Iran and Syria, has provided a large
section of the population with financial support beyond the ability or
willingness of the government and of a capitalist-based Lebanese
economy to do so (clearly of course much of Iran’s resources come from
intimately capitalist dealings in the petroleum markets, while Syria
continues a search for international trade relations). Not only did that
support provide steady income to thousands of Hezbollah fighters who
would otherwise have remained unemployed for lack of skills beyond
military training, but it also supported a wide network of social services
for poor Shi’ite families. Hezbollah has provided monthly pensions to
families of ‘martyrs’ as well as to party veterans and ex-detainees
released from Israeli prisons, in addition to socialised programmes such
as free schooling and access to hospitalisation for everyone among the
faithful in need. Furthermore, the party has been able to mount and
conspicuously publicise post-war rebuilding and development pro-
grammes throughout the Shi’ite rural areas, undercutting whatever
resentment might have existed against its leaders for instigating the
hostilities that brought all this on. Neither the government nor a
bourgeois capitalist-based economy with a democratic agenda was
prepared instantly and efficiently to provide any serious alternative
services to this broad section of the population. As a consequence, the
Iranian foreign policy that supported Hezbollah’s social welfare
programmes for the poor in addition to military backing gained wider
popular sympathy, in contrast to support for the West which rhetorically
supported entrepreneurship and arranged for peace monitoring forces
(and an expanded UNIFIL role). Thus, in another hostage strategy, the
national bourgeois parties were effectively immobilised, unable to
advance an independent agenda without Hezbollah’s approval.
During the conflict with Israel and through his many televised
addresses to the Lebanese, Arabs and Muslim peoples, Hassan
Nasrallah appeared as the de facto president of an ‘Islamic Lebanese
State’.50 Upon his guidance and decision the destiny of the entire
country depended, a fact causing consternation among many Lebanese
and Arab regional opponents of militant Shi’a Islam.51
Israel’s devastating American-backed military retaliation against
Hezbollah in July–August 2006, which led to a widespread destruction
of the country’s civilian infrastructure and to the additional displacement
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of the Shi’ite population from the rural south and the southern suburbs of
Beirut, undermined the government’s power at the very time it had
become a favourite of the West for expelling the Syrians.52 Israel’s attack
further marginalised the bourgeois parties, setting back economic
prosperity and increasing the numbers of homeless, displaced and poor in
the country and increased the chances of renewed sectarian violence. All
of this played into the Hezbollah leadership’s hands. Walid Jumbalt,
Druze leader and head of Progressive Socialist Party, concluded: ‘After 12
July [the start of the Israeli offensive against Hezbollah], Lebanon is now
unfortunately being entrenched solidly into the Syrian-Iranian axis.’ He
went on to add: ‘The hopes of a stable, prosperous Lebanon where we
could attract investments is [sic ] over for now. It is a fatal blow for
confidence.’53 Confronting an ever-increasing non-government-com-
manded welfare economy, a laissez-faire-based democracy has continued
to lack the framework for advancement in the region. Hopes for a strong
stable government attracting foreign investment and generating
economic prosperity, gradually undermining poverty and politically
strengthening the bourgeoisie against radical parties, as envisioned by
global perspectives, continue to be sabotaged. With the keen support of
regional powers, in particular Iran and Syria, Hezbollah retains the
ability to recruit warriors and draw wide-ranging public support to
advance its political programme. Thus a growing social-welfare
revolutionary-based economy commanded by a single party has emerged
in direct competition to the bourgeois state, undermining its political
foundations and its ability to achieve global economic integration or
advance liberal democracy.
Can Democracy Triumph?
Compared to radical Communist parties of the third world during the
Cold War, Hezbollah appears to be a movement equally or more
entrenched among the underclass. As demonstrated in this article,
Hezbollah, as well as various other Middle Eastern Islamist movements,
has emerged as a vanguard of the poor and the dispossessed, battling
global policies that strengthen bourgeois governments and strip the poor
of their basic social safety nets. Led by politically astute clerics, the
party’s ability to mobilise militant adherents from poverty-stricken areas
and across ethnic divides while implanting a non-government party-
commanded welfare economy further aligned Hezbollah as antithetical
to economic liberalisation and democratisation.
In the long term such a movement might, given diminished perceived
foreign threat entailed in suchpotential agreements as a Palestinian-Israeli
accord, an Israeli-Syrian border agreement, a US-Iranian nuclear deal or a
US withdrawal from Iraq, lose some power of appeal. Washington might
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regain regional access by abandoning its extreme interventionist
orientation and more closely aligning its Middle East policy with that of
its European allies such as France and Germany as well as Russia and
China; thus forminganactual ‘global’ approach to the region. Israelmight
reap greater security by finalising direct peace negotiations with the
Palestinians and Syrians, thus de-linking these parties from Iran, which
has vowed to abide by agreements the Palestinian and Syrian authorities
find acceptable. Yet without addressing the root causes of Islamist socio-
economic discontent, which lie in global economic policies that fail to
confront the growth of poverty, despair and dispossession in the Middle
East, radicalism is unlikely to lose its flame.
The precise linkage between economic development and democracy
or civil violence is not entirely clear. Many scholars have noted an
‘inverse U’ relationship, in which it is the transitional economies that
experience the most domestic upheaval and instability.54
Thus there are no guarantees that anti-poverty programmes and
economic infusion will reduce violence and produce pluralistic
democracies, at least in the short term. Yet it appears that the failure
to address the needs of the mass underclass significantly undermines
such political prospects and at least in the short to middle term
empowers militant political organisations, especially if the latter are
ingeniously led with a combination of incorruptibility, tactical flexibility
and opportunism. The advancement of a global liberal democratic
agenda along with political moderation may not be achievable without a
global outlook that supports broad and efficient institutionalised social
welfare programmes.
As demonstrated in this article, Hezbollah’s power is not solely drawn
from public anger against perceived American support of Israel, nor is it
driven solely by a strict adherence to religious precepts. It is not even
entirely based in opposition to Western order and democratisation, or
primarily driven by Iranian-Syrian foreign policy. Rather, all these
factors combine and constitute political outlets for Hezbollah’s
fundamental strength rooted in the socio-economic conditions of the
underclass, in needs unmet by previous Middle Eastern nationalist
movements and regimes. As a US National Intelligence Council report
stressed, ‘[t]he extent to which radical Islam grows and how regimes
respond to its pressures will also have long-term repercussions for
democratisation and the growth of civil society institutions’.55 In this
article we have suggested that uprooting Radical Islamist movements
and advancing democracy in the Middle East, as called for by the West,
remains a political mirage, in stark contrast to the reality of poverty and
economic instability, now compounded by war damage in places such as
Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories, Sudan, Somalia and Lebanon.
Winning the battle against religious militancy, therefore, needs to be,
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crucially, a fight against economic deprivation and political alienation
where the central government takes the initiative, supported by the
global community, in placing effective social-service programmes for the
poor – thus empowering social justice and winning moderation against
despair and extremism. Nothing could be more symbolic of the
opportunity gap and of missed opportunities for reconciliation, for
example, than Israel’s demolition of perfectly viable housing, community
buildings and infrastructure during its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza.
Ultimately, achieving social and international peace and developing
moderation and appropriate forms of democracy can only succeed through
aglobalpolicy thatassists in removing therootcauseof social instabilityand
building the size and influence of those class elements that have traditionally
supported secular democracy. Military intervention and the fight against
terrorism without comprehensive economic development, progress toward
cross-border and cross-cultural peace agreements, conspicuous acts of
mutual inter-cultural respect and sympathy or political reform reducing
authoritarian rule and corruption can only lay the groundwork for the
future growth of extremism and revolutionary reaction.
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39. It is remarkable, for example, that as reported in Western media, during the Israeli bombing
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clientele seemingly remote from the unfolding events.
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Shiite, and 6.2% Druze (Beirut: Statistics Lebanon Ltd, July, 2006).
43. According to Al-Jazeera’s news poll conducted between 17 and 20 August 2006, more than
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priority. Al-Jazeera News Network, http://www.aljazeera.net/Portal/vote/?DoSearch=true&
Subject=???%20????&SelectSite=000&DaysFrom=31&MonthsFrom=7&YearsFrom=
2006&DaysTo=15&MonthsTo=9&YearsTo=2006 [accessed 2006].
44. Tens of thousands of Hezbollah supporters took to the streets against the government
throughout 2006 under various pretexts. In May, massive anti-government labour union
demonstrations led by Hezbollah brought down government economic recovery plans; in June,
Hezbollah supporters blocked streets in protest against a local TV comedy show critical of
Hassan Nassrallah; in September close to one million supporters rallied in celebration of a
claimed Hezbollah victory against Israel, but celebration was soon turned into a demonstration
critical of government policies. Attacks in Iraq against Shi’ite shrines quickly drew massive
street mobilisations critical of the Lebanese government. Events in the Palestinian territories
also had similar outcomes, with Hezbollah blockading major roads and highways with
checkpoints demanding financial and political support for Palestinians while loudspeakers
played revolutionary songs in a direct challenge to the Lebanese central authority. Finally, after
the resignation of its ministers and allies from the cabinet in November 2006, Hezbollah
succeeded in brining the entire country to a halt with hundreds of thousands of supporters
massing in the streets of Beirut demanding the departure of the perceived American-sponsored
government of Prime Minister Fouad Saniora.
45. Hezbollah is believed to receive annually over US$100 million from Iran as well as weapons
and logistic support from Syria to assist its various activities in Lebanon.
46. The ummah refers to ‘Islamic and Arab’ nations or communities of believers. Hezbollah,
through Hassan Nassrallah’s televised interviews and addresses, has stressed this notion to
remain inclusive of non-Muslim communities and refrained from using exclusivist rhetoric
often adopted by other Islamist extremists such as ‘Jihad’ and ‘anti-crusaders’ slogans.
47. The Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and Jordanian governments initially were critical of Hezbollah’s
armed presence and actions against Israel, but had to back off such criticism as war atrocities
emerged and Hezbollah’s appeal swelled regionally.
48. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in a massive car bomb
explosion on 14 February 2005. Hariri was a prominent wealthy Lebanese Sunni leader who
established close linkages with former French President Jaque Chirac and the Saudi ruling
family. He gained significant international and domestic backing that worried the Syrian
regime. The United Nations Security Council passed various resolutions sponsoring an
international tribunal on Hariri’s assassination.
49. After Hezbollah’s July–August 2006 military confrontation with Israel, which coincided with
the escalation of US pressure against Iran’s alleged military-aimed nuclear programme, the
party gained strategic regional importance. It demonstrated an ability to initiate crucial tactical
attacks against Israel whenever called for by a regional confrontation, particularly in a likely
scenario of an Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Iranian or American-Iranian military conflict.
On another front, the party displayed the ability to lead domestic Lebanese political battles in
favour of Syria’s strategic advantage vis-a`-vis Israel and the West. This further strengthened the
centrality of the party within the ‘anti-imperialist’ regional alliance.
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50. 69.3% of 800 Lebanese respondents who were surveyed by Information International in
September 2006 said that they had followed in great detail the televised addresses of
Hezbollah’s general secretary Hassan Nassrallah throughout the war with Israel; 24.5% said
they followed them occasionally, and only 6.2% said they were not interested.
51. Hezbollah’s stance in the Lebanese army’s siege of radical Palestinian Islamists in Nahr
Al-Bared Refugee Camp in May 2007 was slow to develop and represented something of an
enigma in determining the degree of radical solidarity in Lebanese/Palestinian Islamist
movements.
52. Close to one million Lebanese or approximately one-third of the Lebanese population, mostly
Shi’ites, were displaced as a consequence of Israel’s attacks on Lebanon in July–August 2006.
Entire villages and suburbs were reduced to rubble, the civilian infrastructure was severely
destroyed and hundreds were killed and injured. Even with the international airport’s
reopening and villagers’ return home on cratered roads, the consequent economic devastation
and dislocation is alarming the country with massive unemployment, economic stagnation and
poverty, particularly among the Shi’ites.
53. ‘Fighting “has sunk hope of a free Lebanon”’, Financial Times (London), 1 Aug. 2006. Jumblat
is also a leader of the March 14th Alliance.
54. See Demet Yalcin Mousseau, ‘Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?’
Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 5 (2001), pp.547–67.
55. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence
Council’s 2020 Project (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2004).
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